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The conveners asked the third panel of the conference to take a European law perspective, as we are dealing,
after all, with a conflict between two European countries. This European perspective raises several questions,
many of which you can find in the programme. These questions can be roughly organised into two main
categories. First, is there or should there be a particular European law of state immunity? Second, is there a
particular European way of dealing with conflicts that could help find a short-term solution or teach us a long-
term lesson?
1. European Law on State Immunity
Is there a particular European law on state immunity, a European ‘Sonderweg’, that grants an exception from
state immunity in specific cases, for example allowing remedies for grave breaches of public international law
such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity? The short answer is no. It has been shown that the
necessary elements of a corresponding regional customary law cannot be established. State practice in most
European states (except for Italy and Greece) does not limit state immunity. Moreover, the principle of full state
immunity for the exercise of state authority (acta iure imperii) is confirmed elsewhere. The European Union 
Brussels I Regulation, which provides that civil and commercial judgments from one EU state are enforceable
everywhere in the EU, now expressly states that enforceability does not extend to a state’s liability for acts and
omissions incurred during the exercise of state authority. Besides, European states are very concerned about
preserving state immunity for armed forces’ activities during an armed conflict despite accepting the so-called
foreign tort exception to state immunity under the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property or the European Convention on State Immunity. This is preservation stated explicitly by the
European Convention on State Immunity, and made clear by declarations of several European states acceding
the U.N. Convention.
Finally, the European way does not only refer to the European Union, but it also refers to Europe in a broader
sense, and to the European Council in particular. The European Court of Human Rights, in particular, also deals
with issues of state immunity. It has repeatedly held that state immunity may lawfully limit the right to access to a
court, guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, even in the face of torture
(accepting the legitimate aim ‘of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between
States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty’, Al-Adsani, case No. 35763/97, para. 54). Even if
commentators voiced different positions on the potential for a further development of the law of state immunity, it
was beyond dispute that there is no European exceptionalism when it comes to the law of state immunity, as it
currently stands.
However, would it be a good idea to have a specific European customary law of state immunity granting
individual access to a court in certain circumstances? Again, the brief answer is no; at least that is what the
majority of the conference felt. First of all, customary law that is typical of primitive legal systems was considered
the wrong kind of legal source for the delicate task of reconciling state immunity with an individual’s right of
access to a court in a sophisticated legal order. Moreover, there was general unease with the idea of a European
Sonderweg (European exceptionalism) and a European cure for the world (‘Am europäischen Wesen soll die
Welt genesen’). But, most importantly, restricting state immunity was rejected because a majority of participants
feared it would open Pandora’s box; it would endanger any attempt to reach peace and stability after war as the
victims would be encouraged to bring claims in their own countries or elsewhere, instead of living with inevitable
injustices. It would incite forum shopping in Europe. And, if other states followed, it would put European states at
risk of exposure to judicial proceedings abroad, which would not necessarily satisfy the European idea of the rule
of law.
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2. European Solutions and Lessons
Turning to the second question, European solutions and lessons, I would like to start with a preliminary remark.
What does Europe (the European Union as well as the Council of Europe) stand for? The good news is that our
debate, standing out against the current trend of Euroscepticism, recalled the success story of Europe, which
was implicitly and explicitly characterised by peace, stability, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. This
success story also helps explain why the positions of the Italian and Greek claimants have such an appeal
seventy years after World War II. In present-day Europe it seems less urgent to sacrifice individual justice in
order to guarantee peace and stability, and more pressing to provide the highest possible standard of individual
rights.
Now, does Europe provide for solutions to our conflict at hand? Some stressed that the conflict was, to-date,
dealt with in a European way. Disagreements are brought to court (the International Court of Justice in our case)
and are not resolved by the use of force. If that appears somewhat minimalistic, one might add another point –
the legal debate about the correct position on state immunity or the right to access to court does not run along
national lines. Both Italian and German scholars alike criticise either the International Court of Justice or the
Italian Constitutional Court, or support either the case for state immunity or individual rights. This is not at all a
matter of course.
However, does the ‘European way’ also provide for more specific solutions or lessons? With regard to short term
solutions of the specific dispute at hand, the answer must, once again, be no. Like in the other panels, the
participants discussed the arguments in favour of the legal path (further judicial proceedings) and the political
path (negotiations, settlement) without coming up with third options. What’s more, the debate did not suppose
that there would be any short-term implications for European military operations. If these operations are
attributable to the states, the corresponding legal framework of state immunity does not differ from cases of
unilateral operations. In practice, the states would regularly enjoy immunity based on the status of forces
agreements concluded with the territorial state (i.e. based on treaty law, which would make it even harder to
restrict immunity since this would have to be based on ius cogens).
After giving three answers in the negative, what about our panel’s success story, or a European way of dealing
with things? It emerged that the most salient feature of a ‘European way’ was to offer long-term lessons about
dealing with legal conflicts. First, Europe has a long history of judicial conflicts and judicial dialogue. I will only
mention some of the most prominent cases. Within the (now) European Union, constitutional courts have
invoked constitutional provisions to, at least potentially, limit the reach of European Law (Solange). Within the
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights defined the
scope of its jurisprudence with respect to EU-Law (Bosphorus). Finally, the European Court of Justice upheld
human rights in the face of the anti-terrorist sanctions regime set up by the U.N. Security Council (Kadi).
Second, European legal orders have a long history of reconciling and balancing legal rights and interests, as the
omnipresent principle of proportionality illustrates. Insights from this particularly rich experience can guide courts
in future disputes. The panel looked at two techniques of judicial dialogue in particular – the counter-limits
doctrine, applied by the Italian Constitutional Court in Sentenza 238 vis-à-vis the International Court of Justice,
and the test of equivalent protection used by national and European courts (in Solange and Bosphorus, for
example) to ensure respect for fundamental rights vis-a-vis the European Court of Justice. The counter-limits
doctrine prevents international norms from entering into the national system, for the purposes of safeguarding
the supreme principles of the Italian Constitution. This approach can have positive effects first by confirming the
existence of common or at least compatible values in different legal systems, and second by warning the courts
of other legal orders about potential conflicts. However, as was frequently repeated during the conference, the
problem of the barking dog arises – a dog that only barks, and never bites, might lose its credibility. And once the
dog bites, that is, once the counter-limits doctrine prevents the application of international legal rules (as was the
case in Sentenza 238), the contrast between legal orders becomes difficult to reconcile.
The main idea behind the equivalent protection technique, on the other hand, lies instead in the assumption that
safeguarding fundamental rights is a cornerstone of both the (international) legal order from which a legal act
originates and the (national) legal order that should implement it. Thus, it is accepted that the protection provided
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at the national or Convention level and the EU level does not need to be exactly the same, but that the protection
may be comparatively adequate or generally acceptable. Two main differences between these techniques are
evident. First, the equivalent protection technique entails a presumption (the presumption of equivalent human
rights protection), which expresses a particular respect for the international legal order. Second, in assessing the
question of equivalent protection, this technique is more flexible and apt to take different legal interests into
account. In contrast, the counter-limits doctrine is hierarchical and ultimately rests on domestic law and dualist
premises.
Furthermore, it must be emphasised that there are big differences between a judicial dialogue involving a
domestic court and the International Court of Justice, and a dialogue within a highly integrated legal order, like
the European Union or the European Convention on Human Rights. Returning to the barking dog metaphor, it is
much easier to bark, (nearly) bite, and to correct, undo or heal a wrong bark or bite (so to speak) if there are
many avenues of judicial dialogue, such as the referral procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the EU, or the individual application procedure under the Convention system.
Moreover, the Kadi situation (the case in which the European Court of Justice upheld European human rights in
the face of U.N. Sanctions) is not comparable to the Italian Sentenza situation. All participants speaking on that
matter stressed that opposing sanctions by the Security Council – a political organ of fifteen states – is
something wholly different from questioning the authority of the International Court of Justice, the principal
judicial body of the U.N. and the international legal order.
As a consequence, comparing different techniques supports a critical assessment of Sentenza 238. This critique
may be advanced if one looks at the material reasoning regarding the scope of the right of access to justice.
Here, some participants preferred the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights which confirms
that immunity affects the rights to judicial access, but also accepts that immunity might limit this right. Other
participants suggested however, that the rule of state immunity is not open to such a balancing exercise.
As a result, the European approach would not mean that ‘we do it our way’, to paraphrase Frank Sinatra or even
Donald Trump.  Rather, it would reflect the diversity of European solutions to reach a better mode of conflict
resolution in the future.
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